On Counteracting Byzantine Attacks in Network Coded Peer-to-Peer Networks
Kim, MinJi Kim
; Lima, L. L.
; Zhao, F.
;
Barros, J.
; Medard, M.M.
; Kötter, R.
; Kalker, T.Kalker
; K.Han, K.Han
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications Vol. 28, Nº 5, pp. 692 - 702, June, 2010.
ISSN (print): 0733-8716
ISSN (online): 1558-0008
Scimago Journal Ranking: 2,91 (in 2010)
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/JSAC.2010.100607
Abstract
Random linear network coding can be used in peerto-peer networks to increase the efficiency of content distribution
and distributed storage. However, these systems are particularly
susceptible to Byzantine attacks. We quantify the impact of
Byzantine attacks on the coded system by evaluating the probability that a receiver node fails to correctly recover a file. We
show that even for a small probability of attack, the system
fails with overwhelming probability. We then propose a novel
signature scheme that allows packet-level Byzantine detection.
This scheme allows one-hop containment of the contamination,
and saves bandwidth by allowing nodes to detect and drop the
contaminated packets. We compare the net cost of our signature
scheme with various other Byzantine schemes, and show that
when the probability of Byzantine attacks is high, our scheme is
the most bandwidth efficient.
